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Does the use of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) in cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs) of 
health care interventions necessarily discriminate against patients with short life expectancy 
compared with others? This paper reviews the arguments both that it does and that it does not, 
and demonstrates that whether the use of any time-dependent outcome measure in CEA will 
result in discrimination depends, in the context of any given choice between interventions, upon 
the choice of cost-effectiveness ‘threshold’ adopted by the decision maker, whether the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of the intervention for a subgroup of patients with 
relatively short life expectancy lies above the cost-effectiveness threshold, and whether the ICER 
for a subgroup of patients with longer life expectancy falls below the cost-effectiveness 
threshold. For discrimination to result against such patients requires that the long term ratio of 
costs to QALYs associated with the intervention be lower than the short term ratio of costs to 





It has been claimed that the use of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) discriminates unfairly 
against older patients and those with short life expectancies
1.(1-3) Against this view, Claxton 
and Culyer counter-claim that there is nothing inherent in QALYs that will invariably create 
ageist discrimination.(4-6) The discriminatory view has some attraction: patients with shorter life 
expectancy generally have fewer QALYs associated with their remaining life expectancy and, 
since older patients may have a shorter life expectancy than younger patients (and may have a 
persistently worse state of health), it follows that the QALYs associated with their remaining life 
expectancy may generally be fewer too. Interventions with durable quality of life benefits 
therefore tend to yield larger QALY benefits when implemented with patients with longer life 
expectancy, who in turn may be younger. Since public agencies using cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) generally take QALYs into account when assessing whether or not to recommend 
interventions (e.g. NICE) (7), or else use simple life-expectation without adjustment at all, it 
would appear that they discriminate against patients with shorter life expectancy and may be 
inherently ageist. The opposing view is that this discriminatory outcome will not necessarily 
arise because the cost-effectiveness criterion embodies cost as well as health effect, so that 
whether discrimination occurs will depend not only on the timing and duration of benefit but also 
on the timing and duration of costs. 
 
The purpose of this article is to set out the conditions under which discrimination will occur on 
the basis of life expectancy. We further show that, under some conditions, standard applications 
of CEA may, counter-intuitively, result in discriminating against patients with longer rather than 
shorter life expectancy.  The conditions under which discrimination based on life-expectancy 
                                                            
1 See also Quigley (8). 
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 will not occur are likewise derived and, finally, some leading indicators to assist decision-makers 
are suggested in order that advance preparations can be made for assessing the likely degree of 
adjustment of the decision rules in order to eliminate any differentiation that may be deemed 
unfair. 
 
AGEISM AND LIFE-EXPECTANCY 
The term ‘ageism’ is not without ambiguity. The term was coined by R. N. Butler (9) as “… a 
process of systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they are old” 
(p.12). Ageism consists in having prejudicial attitudes towards older people, old age, and the 
aging process. It can be implicit or explicit. It is a form of stereotyping and occurs when it is 
assumed that older people in general are not able to make decisions for themselves, are confused, 
have poor memories, have diseases that are chronic, and so on, any one of which may be true in 
particular cases but which it is unfair and discriminatory to assume are invariable general 
characteristics. Bytheway and Johnson (10), however, observe that the most common approach 
to defining ageism is through some expression of its equivalence to sexism and racism: however 
sexism is defined in regard to gender, or racism in regard to ethnicity, so is ageism defined in 
regard to age. This, however, is hardly a definition. They cite a number of authors whose concept 
of ageism is similarly exemplary rather than lexical, such as Norman (11) who provides a list of 
negative ‘feelings’ that amount to ageism, such as contempt of the young and strong for the old 
and weak, fear of mortality which old age represents, guilt translated into anger; and resentment 




2 In Nord et al. (12) ageism is defined as “to give priority to the young over the elderly” and two subcategories are 
identified: egalitarian ageism, in which each has a claim to the same length of life, and utilitarian ageism, in which 
the greater average life expectation of the young gives them a greater claim. 
4 
 It seems clear that to the extent that the use of QALYs is discriminatory the discrimination arises 
not from the quality adjustment, which is the distinctive feature of the measure, but from the use 
of life expectancy, regardless of the age of the patients who benefit from the intervention in 
question, and changes in it. For this reason, we shall not use the term ‘ageism’, nor enquire 
further as to its appropriate use in the present context. Instead, and in order to be clear in the 
analytics, we shall use the term ‘discrimination according to life expectancy’ (DLE). We thereby 
focus on the consequences of relatively short life expectancy, or relatively short extensions of it, 
regardless of the subject’s age, and whether that is likely to result in implicit unfairness in 
decisions about the cost-effectiveness of health care in formulary-type decision making and 
‘coverage’ decisions about the services to be included in publicly or privately insured health 
care. Specifically, we shall define the use of time-dependent outcome measures of any kind as 
‘discriminatory’ if and only if their use in cost-effectiveness studies implies that it is cost-
effective to provide an intervention for one subgroup but not another where the only 
differentiating factor between the two subgroups is life expectancy. 
 
METHODS 
A FORMAL MODEL 
Suppose that the agency must recommend whether to accept a particular intervention or its 
comparator and is provided with QALY and cost data for two different subgroups of patients: 
subgroup   and subgroup  . Following the intervention, patients in subgroup   have a relatively 
short life expectancy of   years, while those in subgroup   have a longer life expectancy of   
years, so     . The QALY benefits of the intervention are denoted by ∆   for subgroup   and 
∆   for subgroup  , while the costs of the intervention are ∆   for subgroup   and ∆   for 
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 subgroup  . In each case ∆ signals a difference of either outcome or cost between the 
intervention and its comparator. For the moment assume no discounting. The ICERs for the 
intervention are therefore ∆   ∆   ⁄  for subgroup   and ∆   ∆   ⁄  for subgroup  . 
 
Suppose for now that the agency considers only the ICERs of the intervention in question when 
deciding whether to recommend an intervention for any particular subgroup of patients, and that 
it uses a common cost-effectiveness threshold
3 across all subgroups. The cost-effectiveness 
threshold is denoted by  . The agency will recommend the intervention for those patients with 
longer life expectancy if ∆   ∆   ⁄     and will not recommend it for patients with shorter life 
expectancy if ∆   ∆   ⁄    . For DLE to occur therefore requires an ICER for patients with 
longer life expectancy sufficiently lower than the ICER for patients with shorter life expectancy 
that the ICERs straddle the cost-effectiveness threshold: 
  ∆   ∆   ⁄    ∆     ∆   ⁄ .         [ 1 ]  
This is shown graphically in Figure 1. The slopes of the two rays from the origin, Oa and Ob, 
represent the ICERs for the two subgroups, while the slope of the dotted line represents  . The 
region between the two ICERs will hereafter be referred to as the “region of differential cost-
effectiveness”, or RDCE. DLE results only if   lies within the RDCE, as drawn. Where   lies 
above or below the RDCE then the agency will make the same recommendation for both 




3 A more appropriate term might be “lintel”, indicating a maximum, but we adopt the standard practice of referring 
to the threshold as a high level limit. 
4 The greater the difference between the ICERs (and hence the cost-effectiveness of the intervention) for each 
subgroup, the larger the region of differential cost-effectiveness (RDCE). Where the intervention is equally cost-
effective for each subgroup, the RDCE is undefined.  
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 Figure 1 about here 
 
Unfortunately, the characteristics of interventions more or less likely to satisfy condition [1] are 
not immediately obvious. The model will now be used to derive a more intuitive condition for 
decisions to be discriminatory. 
 
A MORE INTUITIVE CONDITION 
Our first step is to extend the model to incorporate time. In general, the QALYs and costs of each 
intervention will not be incurred immediately or even during the first year following the start of 
the intervention but will instead be incurred over a much longer time horizon, in principle over a 
patient’s lifetime
5. It is therefore usual practice to disaggregate the QALYs and costs for each 
subgroup by the year in which they will be incurred
6. Denoting the current year as 1, the QALYs 
and costs for each subgroup may be disaggregated as follows: 
  ∆     ∑ ∆  
   
     ∆    
   ∆    
     ∆    
       [ 2 ]  
  ∆     ∑ ∆  
   
     ∆    
   ∆    
     ∆    
       [ 3 ]  
  ∆     ∑ ∆  
   
     ∆    
   ∆    
     ∆    
     ∆    
     [ 4 ]  
  ∆     ∑ ∆  
   
     ∆    
   ∆    
     ∆    
     ∆    
 ,    [5] 
                                                            
5 This is true even if the intervention itself is short: where the intervention is life-saving – or provides any lasting 
improvement in a patient’s health state, however small – QALY benefits may be realized long after the intervention 
has ended. 
6 This is particularly useful for discounting, which is considered later. 
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 where ∆  
  and ∆  
  represent the QALYs and costs of the intervention for each subgroup,  , in 
each year,  . From [2-5], the ICERs for the intervention may be rewritten as:   
  ∆   ∆   ⁄   ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
             [ 6 ]  
∆   ∆   ⁄   ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
      ,        [ 7 ]  
for subgroups   and   respectively. Condition [1] may then be rewritten as: 
  ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
           ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
      .      [ 8 ]  
We now make an important assumption. In practice, subgroups of patients with different life 
expectancies tend to differ in other attributes as well – patients with shorter life expectancy may 
be older, may have co-morbidities and generally may have worse overall health. Such patients 
may respond differently to the intervention and may incur different costs, particularly if 
complications are more likely. This will inevitably lead to variations between subgroups in terms 
of the QALY benefits and costs of the intervention in each year. However, in order to tease out 
whether an agency’s decision making embodies DLE per se we shall assume that all other 
attributes are equal – that is, patients in subgroup   are identical to those in subgroup   in every 
way other than in life expectancy
7. Where this is the case, the QALYs and costs of the 
intervention will be identical for both subgroups until year  , when those patients in subgroup   
are expected to die. The QALYs and costs will then generally differ between the subgroups from 
year   1  until year  , when those patients in subgroup   are expected to die. After year   the 
QALYs and costs for both subgroups will be zero and need not be considered. Algebraically, 
∆  
   ∆    
 , ∆  
   ∆    
 , … , ∆  
   ∆    
  and ∆  
   ∆    
 ,∆   
   ∆    
 , … , ∆  
   ∆    
 . The ICER 
                                                            
7 We may weaken this assumption if the attributes in which the subgroups differ have no bearing on the QALYs and 
costs associated with treatment.  
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 for subgroup   therefore represents a ‘common ratio’ of costs to QALYs for both subgroups up 
to year  : 
  ∆   ∆   ⁄   ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
       ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
        .    [9] 
For ease of notation, we will refer to the ratio of costs to QALYs for subgroup   over years 
  1  to   as the ‘subsequent ratio’, since these costs and QALYs are incurred in the years 
subsequent to the death of subgroup  . This subsequent ratio may be written algebraically as 
∑ ∆  
   
      ∑ ∆  
   
        . While the ICER for subgroup   is determined solely by the common 
ratio, the ICER for subgroup   is determined by both the common ratio and the subsequent ratio. 
If these ratios are equal then both subgroups have the same ICER
8. Any difference between the 
ICERs is therefore driven by the (generally larger) difference between the ratios. Importantly for 
our purposes, the ICER for subgroup   is lower than the ICER for subgroup   only if the 
subsequent ratio is lower than the common ratio.  
We can use this observation to derive a weaker but more intuitive condition from [8]. A 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the agency to practise DLE is that the ICER for 
subgroup   be lower than that for subgroup  : 
  ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
       ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
      .      [10] 
If both subgroups are identical, except with regard to life expectancy, this is equivalent to stating 
that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for [8] to hold is that the subsequent ratio be lower 





8 This can be determined from Figure 2 and is also a standard result from mathematics – if a ratio is the same over 
years 1 to   as over years   1  to   then it holds over years 1 to  .   ∑ ∆  
   
      ∑ ∆  
   
         ∑ ∆  
   
    ∑ ∆  
   
      .     [11] 
This has a clear prescription: a necessary condition for an agency to be discriminatory in its 
guidance against patients with shorter life expectancy is that the ratio of costs to QALYs for the 
intervention in question be lower over the long term (following the death of patients with shorter 
life expectancy) than over the short term. Whether this holds depends on the intertemporal 
distribution of QALYs and costs for the intervention. It is more likely to hold for interventions 
with largely upfront costs and long term QALY benefits (such as some preventive programmes 
or surgery) and less likely to hold for interventions with continuous long term costs and constant 
or declining QALY benefits (such as long-term care for diabetes or rheumatoid arthritis). In the 
case of the former, the upfront costs increase the common ratio while having no effect on the 
subsequent ratio, while in the latter case the flat or declining QALY benefits and continuous 
long-term costs result in a common ratio equal to or lower than the subsequent ratio. 
Critically, if condition [11] does not hold – and the agency considers only the ICERs when 
making its decisions – then there is no possibility of DLE at all: if the agency accepts the 
intervention for those in subgroup   then it must accept it for those in subgroup  . Even if [11] 
holds, DLE is not inevitable. To satisfy condition [8], the ICER for subgroup   must lie above  , 
and, furthermore, the subsequent ratio must be sufficiently small to pull the ICER for subgroup   
below  .  
 




 This is demonstrated in Figure 2. The slope of the ray Oa is the ICER for subgroup   (the 
common ratio), the slope of Ob is the ICER for subgroup   and the subsequent ratio is the slope 
of cd. As before, the region between the two ICERs represents the region of differential cost-
effectiveness (RDCE). The cost-effectiveness threshold,  , is represented by the slope of Oe. 
DLE requires that Oe falls within the RDCE; DLE requires that Oa lies above Oe and that ab be 
shallower than Oa to such an extent that Ob lies below Oe. If ab is not shallower than Oa then 
there can be no DLE. However, if ab is steeper than Oa then the RDCE will lie above the ICER 
for subgroup  ; if, in addition, Oe lies within the RDCE then the agency will in fact discriminate 




Standard procedures require that estimates of future QALYs and costs be discounted in order to 
account for time preference.(e.g. 7,13,14) Algebraically, the discounted ICERs are now:   
  ∆   ∆   ⁄   ∑
∆  
 
        
 
    ∑
∆  
 
        
 
            [ 1 2 ]  
∆   ∆   ⁄   ∑
∆  
 
        
 
    ∑
∆  
 
        
 
            [ 1 3 ]  
where   denotes the discount rate. The agency’s decisions therefore embody DLE if (from 
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∆  
 
        
 
      .   [14] 
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 Since the discount rate is compounded over time, the long term costs and QALYs which 
comprise the subsequent ratio are discounted more heavily than those which comprise the 
common ratio. This has an ambiguous impact on the size of each ratio
9 but will in all cases 
diminish the influence of the subsequent ratio on the ICER for subgroup  . Interventions with 
largely up-front costs and long term benefits will therefore tend to have higher ICERs following 
discounting, while interventions with relatively flat long term costs and declining QALY benefits 
will tend to have lower ICERs
10.  
This is shown in Figure 2. In view of the ambiguous impact of discounting upon the common 
and subsequent ratios, these ratios are assumed to remain unchanged. However, the rays 
representing the common and subsequent ratios become shorter under discounting, shifting from 
Oa to Od and from ab to cd respectively. Critically, because the costs and QALYs which 
comprise the subsequent ratio are discounted more heavily than those which comprise the 
common ratio, the ray representing the subsequent ratio is shortened proportionally more. As a 
result, the subsequent ratio is relatively less influential in determining the ICER for subgroup  . 
This loss of influence pulls the ICER for subgroup   closer to that for subgroup  , narrowing the  
RDCE
11. The higher the discount rate, the further the RDCE is narrowed, reducing the scope for 
Oe to lie within the RDCE.
12  
                                                            
9 Each ratio will rise or fall depending on the specific distribution of incremental costs and incremental QALYs 
within the ratio – where the costs tend to be incurred later than the QALYs the ratio will likely fall, and vice versa. 
10 Brouwer et al. (15) give some examples of the impact that discounting can have on the ICERs for interventions 
with long term costs or QALY benefits. 
11 This is also true in cases where the subsequent ratio is lower than the common ratio, raising the possibility of 
discrimination against those with longer life expectancy. In such cases, the undiscounted ICER for subgroup L 
(represented by Ob) would lie above that for subgroup S (Oa), but Oc would lie below Ob (rather than above, as 
drawn in Figure 2). Discounting would still narrow the gap between the ICERs, reducing the scope for 
discrimination. 
12 NICE currently discounts costs and QALYs at the same rate. Prior to 2004 it discounted QALYs at a lower rate 
than costs (16). Such a policy of differential discounting has been the subject of much recent debate. (15,17-20) 
Lowering the discount rate applied to QALYs while keeping the discount rate applied to costs fixed would raise the 
denominator in the subsequent ratio proportionally more than the denominator in the common ratio. This would 
12 
 “End of life” interventions 
Few decision making agencies rely solely on a simple decision rule comparing Δc, Δh and λ.  
For example, in England and Wales, following the establishment of a National End of Life Care 
Programme by the Department of Health in January 2009, recommendations from the Citizens 
Council (21) and a public consultation, NICE issued supplementary guidance on evaluating 
“treatments” which satisfy all of the following criteria: (a) the treatment is indicated for patients 
with a short life expectancy, normally less than 24 months; (b) there is sufficient evidence to 
indicate that the treatment offers an extension to life, normally of at least an additional 3 months, 
compared to current NHS treatment; (c) no alternative treatment with comparable benefits is 
available through the NHS; and (d) the treatment is licensed, or otherwise indicated, for small 
patient populations.(22) Where a treatment satisfies these “end of life” criteria and the ICER for 
those patients with short life expectancy is above the cost-effectiveness threshold, NICE now 
considers “the magnitude of the additional weight that would need to be assigned to the QALY 
benefits in this patient group for the cost-effectiveness of the intervention to fall within the 
current threshold range” (22), in other words the weight which would need to be applied to the 
(discounted) QALYs of patients with short life expectancy for the ICER for such patients to fall 
below £30,000 per QALY (the λ used by NICE). If NICE regards this weight as acceptable then 
the intervention may be recommended for those patients even though the ICER is above the cost-
effectiveness threshold. For example, in NICE’s recent appraisal of Lenalidomide for the 
treatment of multiple myeloma, the committee identified the weight for the relevant subgroup of 
patients as being approximately 1.4 (corresponding to an ICER of £43,800 per QALY) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
lower both ratios and so lower the ICERs for both subgroups. However, it is ambiguous whether or not this would 
widen the RDCE and in turn increase the scope for discrimination on the basis of life expectancy – the extent to 
which each ratio would fall would depend upon the specific distribution of incremental costs and incremental 
QALYs within each ratio. 
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 deemed such a weight to be acceptable.(23) Lenalidomide was subsequently approved for those 
patients despite the ICER lying well above NICE’s conventional cost-effectiveness 
threshold.(24) 
This supplementary rule can be straightforwardly incorporated into our model. Suppose that, 
following the intervention, the life expectancy of those patients in subgroup   is less than 2 
years, while the life expectancy of those in subgroup   is greater than 2 years (i.e.   2   ). 
For interventions which satisfy the “end of life” criteria, NICE would now apply a weight to the 
QALYs for patients in subgroup   but not to those for patients in subgroup  . It would therefore 
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         [15] 
where Ω denotes the highest acceptable weight that the agency is willing to assign to the QALYs 
of those with shorter life expectancy.  
Equivalently (and perhaps more intuitively), the agency could instead be viewed as adopting a 
higher cost-effectiveness threshold for patients with shorter life expectancy,   , rather than 
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∆  
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∆  
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∆  
 
        
 
       [16] 
where   =   Ω ⁄  and Ω  1 .  
In Figure 2 this higher cost-effectiveness threshold,   , is represented by Of. For “end of life” 
interventions, where the subsequent ratio is lower than the common ratio (as in Figure 2), 
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 discrimination against those in subgroup   now requires that both Oe and Of (rather than only 
Oe) lie within the RDCE, narrowing the scope for DLE. Furthermore, if Oe lies below the RDCE 
and Of lies above the RDCE then the agency will now discriminate against patients with longer 
life expectancy. NICE’s “end of life” guidance thus widens the scope for discrimination against 
those with longer life expectancy – such discrimination now occurs not only if Oe lies within the 
RDCE but also if Oe lies below the RDCE and Of lies within the RDCE. The deliberative 
character of the NICE process makes it, however, unlikely that such discrimination could in 
practice occur. NICE regards its decision making as a deliberative process and makes 
considerable use of patient and other stakeholder representation. As a result, agencies adopting 
NICE-like methods and processes are less likely to discriminate between subgroups on the basis 




In the following examples it is assumed that, following a hypothetical intervention, patients in 
subgroup S have a life expectancy of one year while those in subgroup L have a life expectancy 
of two years (i.e. p=1, q=2). It is assumed that the intervention is cost-effective only if the ICER 
lies below a cost-effectiveness threshold of £30,000 per QALY, or £45,000 per QALY in the 
case of “end of life”interventions. The discount rate is assumed to be 3.5%, with no discounting 





Suppose that the incremental costs and QALYs associated with the intervention in each of the 
first two years are as follows: 
  Year 1  Year 2 
Incremental costs  £12,000  £3000 
  Discounted at 3.5%  £12,000  £2899 
Incremental QALYs  0.3  0.3 
  Discounted at 3.5%  0.3  0.2899 
 
Without discounting, the ICER for subgroup S (the common ratio) is £12,000 / 0.3 = £40,000 per 
QALY (not cost-effective), while the ICER for subgroup L is (£12,000 + £3000) / (0.3 + 0.3) = 
£25,000 per QALY (cost-effective). This results in DLE. 
With discounting, the ICER for subgroup S remains £40,000 per QALY (not CE) but the ICER 
for subgroup L increases to (£12,000 + £2899) / (0.3 + 0.2899) = £25,258 per QALY (cost-
effective). In this example, DLE remains following discounting, despite a slight narrowing of the 
region of differential cost-effectiveness (RDCE).  
If this intervention were to be regarded as an “end of life” treatment for those patients in 
subgroup S, the intervention would be considered cost-effective for both subgroups and there 






Now suppose the intervention has the following incremental costs and QALYs: 
  Year 1  Year 2 
Incremental costs  £8,000  £4000 
  Discounted at 3.5%  £8,000  £3865 
Incremental QALYs  0.2  0.1 
  Discounted at 3.5%  0.2  0.0966 
 
Without discounting, the ICER for subgroup S is £40,000 per QALY (not cost-effective), while 
the ICER for subgroup L is also £40,000 per QALY (not cost-effective). There is no DLE since 
the intervention appears equally cost-ineffective for both subgroups.  
Following discounting, both ICERs remain at £40,000 per QALY (not cost-effective), with no 
DLE.  
However, if the intervention were to be regarded as “end of life” for subgroup S, it would now 
appear cost-effective for subgroup S but not for subgroup L, introducing DLE against those with 
longer life expectancy. This is despite the fact that patients with longer life expectancy gain more 






Finally, suppose that the intervention has the following incremental costs and QALYs: 
  Year 1  Year 2 
Incremental costs  £5000  £4000 
  Discounted at 3.5%  £5000  £3865 
Incremental QALYs  0.2  0.1 
  Discounted at 3.5%  0.2  0.0966 
 
Without discounting, the ICER for subgroup S is £25,000 per QALY (cost-effective), while the 
ICER for subgroup L is £30,000 per QALY (not cost-effective), resulting in DLE against those 
with longer life expectancy (despite such patients gaining more QALYs from the intervention).  
However, following discounting, the ICER for subgroup S remains at £25,000 per QALY (cost-
effective) while the ICER for subgroup L falls below the threshold to £29,886 per QALY (also 
cost-effective). In this example the impact of discounting is to eliminate DLE. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have sought to settle an issue as to whether the use of QALYs in CEA discriminates against 
patients with shorter life expectancy (DLE). Using a simple model of the decision making 
setting, we have shown that DLE is neither inherent nor inevitable and requires the following 
readily understandable conditions to hold for the intervention in question: (a) the ICER for 
patients with shorter life expectancy must lie above the cost-effectiveness threshold; and (b) the 
ICER for patients with longer life expectancy must fall below the cost-effectiveness threshold. 
Satisfying these conditions requires that the ratio of costs to QALYs be lower over the long term 
than over the short term. In practice of course, decision rules are usually more complex than the 
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 slavish following of a simple ICER threshold. Thus, these conditions must hold after taking into 
account discounting (which reduces the scope for DLE) and any other special factors such as 
“end of life” status if guidance is to be unfairly discriminatory. 
Where interventions fail to satisfy either of conditions (a) or (b), an agency’s guidance could 
discriminate against patients with longer life expectancy. Indeed, in the case of “end of life” 
interventions, NICE’s recent supplementary guidance quite intentionally increases the scope for 
discrimination against patients with longer life expectancy by weighting the QALYs of patients 
with shorter life expectancy higher.  
DLE would be inherent if decision makers considered only the remaining life-years or QALYs in 
each patient’s life when considering interventions. However, agencies such as NICE instead 
consider the incremental life-years associated with interventions (often quality-adjusted in some 
way appropriate to the patient group under consideration) and also consider the incremental costs 
of interventions. While saving the life of a patient with long life expectancy tends to yield a 
larger QALY benefit, the long term costs associated with any such intervention will generally 
also be greater. Indeed, the ICER associated with treating that patient may then be as high (or 
higher) than that for treating a patient with shorter life expectancy. It is ICERs – not the 
incremental QALY benefits alone, and certainly not the remaining years of a patient’s life – that 
form an important (if by no means the only) consideration in the decision making processes of 
agencies which make use of CEA. 
Although it is not the case that use of QALYs as an outcome measure necessarily entails DLE, 
agencies do need to be alert to the possibility that DLE can arise and be aware of the 
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 circumstances that can give rise to in order that any compensating actions deemed necessary can 
be taken. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis has important implications for agencies adopting a time-dependant measure of 
health such as the QALY in their decision making. The first is that a strict application of CEA 
can result in DLE. However, the main implication of our analysis is that such discrimination is 
neither inevitable nor inherent. It can arise only when the intervention under consideration 
satisfies the following conditions: 
a)  The ICER for a subgroup of patients with relatively short life expectancy lies above 
the cost-effectiveness threshold; and 
b)  The ICER for a subgroup of patients with longer life expectancy falls below the cost-
effectiveness threshold. 
For these conditions to hold requires that the long term ratio of costs to QALYs associated with 
the intervention be lower than the short term ratio of costs to QALYs. Such interventions are 
likely to display specific identifiable characteristics, particularly relatively high upfront costs 
and/or long term health benefits. Where such characteristics are identified, a consideration of the 
possibility of discrimination ought to inform the deliberations of the agency. The sensitivity of 
judgement to these variables could readily be tested by simulation and sensitivity analysis, even 
at early stages of an investigation. The agency should also be aware that when neither of these 
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Figure 2 
*With discounting the common ratio is represented by the dotted line only; 
without discounting the common ratio is extended by the bold line. 
**With discounting the RDCE is represented by the left shaded region only; 
without discounting the RDCE is represented by both shaded regions. 
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